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the control literature talks about different control modes (e.g., formal and informal control modes classified as behavior, outcome, clan, and self-control modes) without adequately distinguishing among the different control mechanisms enacting each of the control modes. In this research, by explicitly classifying the distinctions that exist within each of the control modes, we uncover the key role played by mechanistic governance in outsourced ISD. Grounding our arguments in the information requirement for performance evaluation, the study theorizes the moderating influence of mechanistic governance on the relationships of contract specificity and relational governance with ISD quality and cost performance. We test the theorized model in a field study comprising 160 offshore ISD projects executed by Indian vendors. Our results establish the significant complementary role of mechanistic governance on the relationships of contract specificity with both cost and quality performance variables. Further, mechanistic governance substitutes the impact of relational governance on cost performance. thus, the study theoretically as well as empirically establishes the need for conceptualizing mechanistic governance as a viable and significant governance mechanism for offshore ISD contracts. the study also teases out the distinctions between the two prime contract types in vogue for managing offshore ISD contracts, namely, fixed price and time and materials contracts. the study thus contributes not only to control theory but also to the stream of literature examining offshore ISD contracts. Further, the study provides insights to managers on having well-specified contracts and acknowledging the role of mechanistic governance for better performance.
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a Central problem faCed by organizationS that outsource systems development pertains to managing the relationship between the client and vendor for better performance. Often such organizations use a variety of control modes for achieving this. Control is defined as a set of systems and procedures designed to motivate performance to attain desired objectives [28, 32] . It is through the exercise of control that clients can motivate vendors to deliver applications that meet the clients' specific requirements and are of value to them. In recent years, many outsourced systems development projects have failed to deliver their intended benefits [63] . the problem is critical for offshore systems development projects, where about 50 percent of the projects fail outright or do not meet client expectations in the first place [49, 57] . therefore, research that focuses on explaining offshore contract performance is of value to both research and practice.
From a control theory perspective, three gaps in information systems development (ISD) control are particularly noteworthy. First, prior research has either focused on factors (e.g., project size, outcome measurability, behavior measurability) explaining the choice of control modes [32, 52] or has examined the specific control modes (e.g., outcome, behavior, clan, and self-control modes) used for a project [8, 28] . relatively few studies have examined the moderating effects of control modes on project perfor-mance, especially in the context of outsourcing contracts [63, 64] . Increasingly, firms are utilizing vendors (both onshore and offshore) to cater to their systems development needs; hence, contractual ISD requires deeper theoretical understanding from a control perspective. Moreover, prior literature on contract administration has primarily used either transaction cost economics (tCE) or relational exchange perspectives for examining exchanges between the client and vendor [27, 42, 55] . In contrast, this research, although primarily grounded in the control literature, also draws on tCE and relational exchange perspectives to explain offshore ISD contract performance.
Second, although the control literature distinguishes among different control modes (e.g., formal and informal control modes-outcome control and behavior control being formal modes; clan control and self-control being informal modes) [28] , it does not explicitly describe control mechanisms acting within each of the different control modes. Control mechanisms are the ways in which different control modes are enacted, that is, "what" and "how" control modes operate. Often the description of control modes subsumes the underlying control mechanisms, that is, control modes depict not only "what" is controlled (e.g., what outcomes and behaviors) but also "how" it is controlled (i.e., the processes used to attain the desired outcomes and behaviors). Distinguishing between different control mechanisms (i.e., what and how) within each of the control modes will offer a more nuanced theoretical understanding of the control portfolios in the context of contract administration.
third, prior research has shown that clients can choose to exercise either formal or informal modes of control in their relationship with vendors [8] . recent studies have also shown that organizations can choose to use a mix of different modes of control. In fact, in an outsourcing relationship, different modes of control could interact with one another for explaining the systems development ambidexterity [63] . It will be interesting to examine if such relationships also exist for systems development performance. the control literature, similar to tCE and relational exchange perspectives, views formal and informal control modes as substitutes. In contrast, the interfirm adaptation perspective argues them to be complements [7, 63] . recent research grounded in the control literature has shown that the two modes not only function as substitutes but also as complements [63] . this further alludes to the theoretical tension described by Anderson and Dekker [3] calling for deeper examination of complementarities and substitution effects among different control modes [63] . hence, it is theoretically motivating to examine the interactions within different control mechanisms acting across control modes. this should offer a more granular understanding of the outsourced ISD performance. the paper begins the discussion by theorizing for two control mechanisms operating within each of the control modes. Structural control mechanism describes the "what," or the structure of the control mode. Process control mechanism explains "how," or the process through which the control mode is enacted. Almost all outsourced client-vendor relationships function under the broad framework of a formally agreed upon contract that describes the structure (expected outcomes or behaviors) of their relationship. Because it is very difficult to specify complete contracts, contracts are generally bounded in terms of their extensiveness and completeness [3, 61] . hence, contracts vary in terms of their contract specificity, that is, the explicitness of details specified for coordinating the relationship between the client and vendor [50] . Despite differences in their contract specificities, client and vendor have the option of choosing "how" they wish to govern their relationship. From a purely transactional perspective, they may decide to follow the specified contract very closely, in a mechanistic fashion, by not allowing for any deviations from the prespecified outcomes and procedures. We term this mechanism of contract governance as mechanistic governance mechanism. On the other hand, despite having a prespecified contract, client and vendor can choose to follow the relational perspective. this implies that they rely more on their ongoing relationship and mutual trust for deciding about emergent operational situations, rather than following the contract very closely. We term this mechanism of contract governance as relational governance mechanism. In actual practice, although all client-vendor relationships have a formally specified contract (structural control mechanism), they follow a mix of mechanistic and relational governance (process control mechanisms). Further, although prior studies have examined the role of contracts and relational mechanisms, the explicit conceptualization and role of mechanistic governance needs deeper investigation.
In relation to the identified research gaps, this study is guided by the following research questions:
RQ1: Does mechanistic governance complement or substitute the benefits of contract specificity in enhancing ISD performance for offshore outsourced projects?
RQ2: Does mechanistic governance complement or substitute the effect of relational governance in enhancing ISD performance for offshore outsourced projects? the idea is developed that mechanistic governance, which is a process control mechanism, interacts with the contract specification, which is a structural control mechanism, in affecting ISD contract performance in terms of output quality and cost. Based on the evaluation information required for the two kinds of performance measures, we theorize and develop hypotheses for mechanistic governance as complementing the impact of contract specificity on performance. Similarly, we also theorize and hypothesize for mechanistic governance as substituting the impact of relational governance in affecting ISD performance. the hypothesized relationships are tested using data obtained from 160 offshore outsourced projects.
this research makes three major contributions. First, it offers a more nuanced conceptualization of the mechanisms operating within each of the control modes. the usefulness of this conceptualization is exhibited by the granular interaction effects that we observe within and across the different control structures and processes in influencing ISD project performance. this paper thus contributes to better understanding of the nuances inherent in the control perspective. Second, although past research has made a distinction between contract and relational governance (e.g., [55] ), this research is one of the first to explicitly conceptualize mechanistic governance as a process con-trol mechanism for ISD outsourcing. We thus contribute to the literature on offshore ISD from a control perspective. third, our results show that the control modes and mechanisms influence the two performance measures (ISD quality performance and ISD cost performance) differently. these differences can be explained by the different informational requirements to make the performance evaluation. this reiterates the importance of understanding the systems development project requirements clearly for effectively managing their performance. this further contributes to the offshore systems development literature.
theory and hypotheses
Offshore Contract Performance in an outSourCing relationShip, the contract between the client and vendor represents promises, obligations, rewards, and penalties for performing particular actions in the future [46] . Contracts are central to most supply arrangements, providing a legally binding institutional framework enunciating the rights, duties, and responsibilities of the client and vendor [71] . Although almost all client-vendor relationships are managed through contracts, individual contracts vary a great deal in terms of their complexity, completeness, extensiveness, and detail. the more complete and detailed the contract, the more specific is the description of promises, duties, procedures, and penalties for noncompliance. In this research, we define contract specificity as the degree of explicitness of details specified for coordinating the relationship between the client and vendor [50] . Prior research, in different contexts, has exhibited a significant link between contract specification and outsourced project performance [3, 61] .
Since the last decade, there has been an increasing trend in the outsourcing of services to offshore vendors. Coordinating working relationships between client and vendor separated by multiple time zones, languages, and cultures is an even bigger challenge than onshore outsourcing relationships. Often, the contract is the prime instrument facilitating the interaction between client and vendor. A review of the literature on offshore contract performance reveals that research in this field has made impressive strides within a short period. But most research has focused on specific outcome performance variables at multiple levels of analysis, such as the impact of offshoring on organizational cost structures [5, 11] , organizational innovation [34, 41] , firm survival [9] , firm cost performance [4] , and even national economy [13] . Some studies have examined the processes through which value is created for the offshoring client firm [38] . Still others (e.g., [21] ) have explored the conditions under which this value is created. But research on offshore ISD performance related to contract administration (especially in terms of moderating effects of control mechanisms) is rather limited as seen from a summary of key research on control and ISD projects (see the Appendix). As the contract is the prime instrument facilitating interaction between client and vendor, there is a need for deeper theoretical understanding of its effect on performance. the current research, which approaches offshore contract administration from a control theory perspective, by integrating prior learnings on the subject from tCE and relational exchange perspectives, aims to address this gap in offshore contract performance literature.
Specifically, we examine two performance parameters for an offshore systems development project, namely, ISD quality performance and ISD cost performance. ISD quality performance refers to the achievement of specified quality standards for the developed software. In contrast, ISD cost performance relates to appropriate cost savings and financial performance realized for the client through the systems development project.
Contract Administration: Integrating Control Modes with transactional and relational Perspectives Control Modes and Client-Vendor relationship recent research on ISD contracts describes the use of formal as well as informal control modes for coordinating the relationship between client and vendor (e.g., [58, 63] ). Prior literature describes two types of control modes: formal and informal control modes. the formal mode aims to exercise control through performance evaluation, rewards, and punishments, whereas the informal mode uses social or people strategies for exercising control [29, 32] . Formal control modes are further subdivided into outcome and behavior control modes, whereas informal modes are subdivided into clan control and self-control modes.
Outcome control refers to prespecified final or intermediate outputs without regard to the processes for achieving them. Behavior control, however, refers to the specification of methods, procedures, and techniques for executing the specified tasks. A formal contract between client and vendor can specify both the desired outcomes as well as behaviors. Among informal modes, clan control refers to control exercised through reinforcement of acceptable norms through shared common beliefs, values, and vision. In contrast, self-control refers to self-imposed norms governing the work processes. In the context of the client-vendor relationship, clan control has been found to be an important mode and is thus included in this study [63] . But as self-control in a client-vendor setting is analogous to noncontrol, and previous studies have found it to be an insignificant control mode in the outsourcing context (e.g., [8, 64] ), we do not include it in this study.
transactional and relational Perspectives on Control Modes
In addition to being grounded in the control literature, substantial past research on contracts draws upon transactional and/or relational perspectives [27, 55] . the transactional perspective, based on tCE, explains how contract governance arrangements may be crafted so as to mitigate exchange hazards and uncertainty between exchange partners in a scenario of opportunism and bounded rationality [67, 68] . In an offshore outsourcing relationship between client and vendor, transactional mechanisms may be set in place so as to maintain stability and continuity of the relationship [42] . this perspective is generally similar to the modalities described in the formal control mode for motivating the desired behaviors and outcomes from the client and vendor.
the transactional perspective posits an economic relationship between client and vendor depending on well-articulated, clear incentives and penalties. It also implies that the client and vendor will closely adhere to what is agreed upon and any deviation from what is specified is not expected in a transactional relationship. the rationale for transactional perspective in the client-vendor relationship is the premise of self-interest that each party has from the relationship. Differences in goals and operational routines, opportunistic behaviors, uncertainty, changing expectations, and unexpected market changes are some of the reasons that both the contracting parties may wish to mitigate through a transactional relationship [24, 42] . Classical contract theory (based on tCE) presumes that it is possible to draft complete contracts. this means that by clearly specifying the dos and don'ts for contracting parties, all the necessary safeguards for mitigating opportunism and reducing transactional ambiguity can be put in place [43, 44] . however, in practice, drafting costs, information asymmetry, and unforeseeable contingencies renders most contracts as incomplete. At best, contracts can specify procedures for resolving unforeseeable situations [55] . hence, there are methods that go beyond being purely transactional in nature for administering contracts.
these methods, based on the relational perspective, take into consideration the relational logic between client and vendor [71] . In contrast to the transactional perspective, the relational perspective on the client-vendor relationship is based on social exchange theory, where social interactions and embedded relationships play an important role in economic activities [1, 19] . relational norms of trust and shared understanding are often viewed as substitutes for complex transactional relationships [69] . the logic behind relational contracting is the existence of many nonlegal sanctions that make it contingent for exchange partners to fulfill their commitments [7, 45] . Social exchange theorists describe multiple mechanisms through which the relational perspective controls opportunism. there may be norms of expected behavior in the client-vendor exchange because of embeddedness of social connections that precludes the need for formal controls [19] . Other mechanisms through which the need for formal controls is obviated are the fear of ostracism [39] and the formation of social bonds that increase commitment among parties for maintaining a cooperative relationship [59] . thus, the relational perspective suggests that over time, exchange partners build, test, scrutinize, and substantiate the existence of mutual relationships. Subsequently, these developed relationships serve as efficient safeguards for economic transactions. the relational view on coordination between client and vendor is similar to the informal control modes, especially the clan control mode. Similar to formal and informal modes interacting with each other [63] , past research on contracts using transactional and relational perspectives has shown that contract performance can also be explained by the interaction between transactional and relational perspectives (e.g., [55] ). We use transactional and relational perspectives for further developing the control mechanisms through which the different control modes operate.
Distinguishing Between Control Mechanisms Operating Within Control Modes
In addition to acknowledging the presence of different control modes, it is important to understand the mechanisms through which control modes operate. We posit that control mechanisms describe "what" and "how" different control modes are enacted. Prior literature does discuss the control mechanisms through which control modes operate, but does not distinguish between the submechanisms describing "what" operates the control mode and "how" the control mode operates. For example, Choudhury and Sabherwal, when describing outcome and behavior control mechanisms, describe the "what" and "how" of control modes together, without distinguishing between the two submechanisms, which we term as structural and process control mechanisms:
this [outcome control] is achieved through the use of mechanisms that specify desired outcomes (e.g., functional specifications and target implementation date) and mechanisms that help measure the controlee's performance with respect to specified outcomes (e.g., software testing by client personnel). . . . Behavior control is implemented through mechanisms that specify appropriate behaviors (e.g., development methodology), or those that allow the controller to evaluate behavior. [8, p. 293] We believe that distinguishing between the two described submechanisms of control will assist in a better appreciation of the phenomenon. In this study, we classify "what" operates the control mode as the structural control mechanism, which essentially elucidates the framework governing coordination between client and vendor. For example, for the formal mode, it will be the "contract" between client and vendor, whereas for the informal mode, the structural control mechanism can be "shared norms/vision" or "self-imposed norms" (Figure 1 ). In a similar vein, we define "how" the control mode is operated as the process control mechanism, which fundamentally describes the modus operandi of coordination between client and vendor. the process mechanisms for different control modes are different, namely, mechanistic governance, relational governance, and self-governance. Distinguishing between structural and process control mechanisms is also consistent with the two key stages in contract management, namely, contact specification and contract implementation [10, 70] .
It should be noted that distinguishing between the two submechanisms is not essential, if there is a tight coupling between the structural and process mechanisms. For example, in the case of formal control mode, where the structural control mechanism is the "contract," if there is only "mechanistic governance" as the process control mechanism, then there is no need to distinguish between the structural and process mechanisms. But prior studies have shown that even a formal control structure (contract) could be governed using relational governance in addition to mechanistic governance [55] . In fact, there could be multiple possible combinations of structural and process mechanisms among formal and informal modes, which further explains how different control modes operate together [63] . We believe that distinguishing between the structural and process mechanisms is imperative for a richer understanding of the outsourcing phenomenon. Moreover, there is a need to acknowledge the explicit presence of mechanistic governance as a process control mechanism, which clearly has not been the focus of prior studies.
Multiple combinations of structural and process control mechanisms imply that there can be loose coupling between structural and process control mechanisms [65] . So clients can choose to have a formal structural control mechanism (contract) either with a formal process mechanism (mechanistic governance), an informal process mechanism (relational governance), or a combination of the two. We posit that informal modes will have different control mechanisms, that is, clan control has shared norms as structural control mechanism, and relational governance as process control mechanism. Similarly, for self-control mode, self-imposed norms describe the structural control mechanism and self-governance is the process control mechanism. As prior research has established the nonsignificance of self-control mode in the outsourcing context [63, Figure 1 . Control Mechanisms Acting Within Different Control Modes 64], we do not examine self-control mode in this study. Moreover, for clan control mode, we examine only the process control mechanism. Specifically, for examining the relationship between client and vendor, we focus on contract specificity as a formal structural control mechanism, mechanistic governance as a formal process control mechanism, and relational governance as an informal process control mechanism. It is imperative to study the role of contract governance mechanisms in addition to contract specification, as recent research acknowledges that well-specified and extensive contracts may fail to give the desired results because they may be incomplete with respect to enforcement [61] . While mechanistic governance has not been explicitly examined in the offshoring scenario, we hypothesize for its interaction with contract specificity and relational governance.
linking Contract Administration to Project Performance
Information-Based Control tiwana and Keil [64] distinguish between attempted and realized control. Attempted control is the degree to which a controller implements a specific control mode, whereas realized control is the degree to which a controller is able to successfully exercise the chosen control mode. So for control to be effective, realizing the attempted control is imperative. But realizing control is largely information based, requiring appropriate evaluation information [53, 63] . hence, from a control theory perspective for determining the performance of an outsourced ISD development project, appropriate evaluation information must be available for comparing the actual situation with the desired situation [53, 63] . More so, in the context of formal control modes (outcome and behavioral), enforcing control requires information for evaluating the vendor's compliance with the required criteria. Similar to tiwana [63] , in this study we employ an evaluation information requirements perspective for explaining the role of control mechanisms in determining performance. the current research examines the impact of control mechanisms on two key ISD performance variables for outsourced ISD, that is, quality and cost. Although prior research has found linkages between quality and cost performance, from an evaluation information requirements perspective, the two are dissimilar. Quality performance in the ISD context is related to the "fitness for use" for the client according to prespecified and observable ISD criteria, which can generally be unambiguously specified in the contract and do not usually change with time. In other words, quality standards specified in the contract usually remain relatively stable. thus, ISD quality evaluation criteria tend to be rather static. Better visibility of the vendor's work processes through closer relational interactions between client and vendor may provide some additional process information about compliance with the quality standards. yet the evaluation information remains essentially the same during contract implementation.
In contrast, ISD cost performance entails evaluation information that demonstrates that cost incurred by the client is appropriate for the level of services provided by the vendor. Although criteria for cost performance is specified in the contract (in terms of prenegotiated prices), the market in which ISD operates is very dynamic. It is possible that during contract implementation, other vendors may propose competitively lower price offerings for similar jobs. So the client could expect the vendor to lower the prenegotiated prices. In a similar vein, it is plausible that the vendor may incur additional expenses due to some genuine exigencies during contract execution. In such a situation, the vendor would look to increasing prices. the key concern for the client in an ISD contract is to pay an "appropriate price" for the services offered by the vendor. Better visibility of the ongoing vendor's cost structures and processes may help the client in assessing the reasonableness of the price structures and escalations (if any). Also, a better flow of information between the client and vendor, through relational interaction, about the dynamic market conditions may assist in price renegotiation during contract implementation to match competitive market rates. thus, a channel for the sharing of information between the client and vendor would provide the required reassurance to the client about the appropriateness of the project's cost performance and also assist in renegotiating contract prices to match the dynamic market conditions, if required.
Prior research has established the impact of contract specificity and governance mechanisms (especially relational governance) on exchange performance; hence, in the current research, we theorize for the interactions among the various control mechanisms (structural and process). Specifically, we examine how mechanistic governance moderates the impact of contract specificity and relational governance on ISD quality and cost performance. A summary of the theoretical logic from the evaluation information requirements perspective for the various relationships is given in table 1.
Mechanistic Governance as Complement to Contract Specificity
Contract specificity describes the degree of explicitness of details specified in the contract for coordinating the relationship between the client and vendor [50] . From a performance evaluation perspective, contract specificity sets and communicates the information about the required quality and cost metrics to both the client and vendor. Standards specified in the contract serve as benchmarks that need to be attained by the vendor in terms of quality and cost parameters. Prior research has established the significant relationship of contract specificity (or extensiveness and completeness) with different performance-related parameters [3, 61] . Contract specificity represents the degree of attempted control for attaining the desired performance [64] . this attempted control could be exercised through process control mechanisms. Mechanistic governance describes a process control mechanism where the relationship between the client and vendor is governed by closely following the written formal contract. Mechanistic governance does not allow for any deviations from the prespecified outcomes and procedures.
the evaluation information needed for evaluating ISD quality is generally well specified, where quality performance is measured by comparing the realized performance with the prespecified standards. More often than not, the specified quality standards are rather static, implying no or minimal change during the course of contract implementa- Appropriate cost savings for client.
Performance evaluation criterion Has vendor met the specified quality criteria?
Has vendor provided appropriate cost savings?
Information needed for performance evaluation ISD quality performance is measured by comparing with prespecified quality standards that do not usually change with time for specific ISD client requirements. Hence, the required evaluation information is rather static and can generally be well specified in the contract.
The price information specified in the contract serves as the primary measure for ISD cost performance evaluation. But ISD operates in dynamic market conditions where other vendors may come up with competitively lower price offerings. Also, the vendor may have cost overruns due to genuine exigencies. In either situation, if the client and vendor share mutual information on dynamic market conditions and on their cost structures, there could be room for renegotiating prices during contract implementation, if required. Hence, all evaluation information cannot be well specified in the contract.
Role of structural mechanism (contract specificity) Sets and communicates the information about the specified quality metrics.
Sets and communicates the information about the specified price levels.
Role of process mechanism (mechanistic governance) Informs about adherence to prespecified quality standards. No additional information about specified quality standards.
Informs about adherence to prespecified price standards. No additional information about specified price standards.
Role of process mechanism (relational governance) Relational exchange additionally informs by providing better visibility of vendor's quality processes to client.
Relational exchange additionally informs by providing better visibility of the vendor's cost structures to the client. Also useful in exchanging information between the client and vendor about dynamic market conditions and vendor cost overruns, thereby providing a basis for renegotiating prices, if required.
Interaction of contract specificity with mechanistic governance (structural × process) By facilitating close adherence to specified contract in terms of quality parameters, informs about close compliance to specified quality standards. Hence, with increasing mechanistic governance, the influence of contract specificity on quality performance increases. (H1) By facilitating close adherence to specified contract in terms of cost parameters, informs about close compliance to specified price standards. Hence, with increasing mechanistic governance, the influence of contract specificity on cost performance increases. (H2)
Interaction of relational governance with mechanistic governance (process × process) Relational governance, which is based on trust and the relationship between the client and vendor, plays some role in influencing the ISD quality performance by providing better visibility of the vendor's quality processes to the client. But once quality processes are known through relational mechanisms, no further dynamic evaluation information is accessed by the client. Hence, we do not expect mechanistic governance to significantly influence the impact of relational governance on quality performance. (H3)
Relational governance, which is based on trust and the relationship between the client and vendor, influences cost performance by providing better visibility of the vendor's cost structures to the client and also by exchanging information between the client and vendor about the dynamic market conditions for renegotiating prices, if required. Thus, the accessed evaluation information through relational governance is dynamic, which requires a continuous ongoing trusted relationship. In contrast, mechanistic governance is based on close compliance to the prespecified rules in the contract, without due consideration of trust and the ongoing relationship between the client and vendor. This mechanistic compliance may convey a negative signal about the client's lack of trust and concern for the ongoing client-vendor relationship, which may serve to attenuate the effect of relational governance on cost performance. (H4) tion. Clearly, close adherence to the contract is expected to ensure the desired quality standards. Mechanistic governance not only informs about adherence to specified quality standards but also ensures close adherence to the contract. thus, we expect mechanistic governance to positively moderate the impact of contract specificity on ISD project quality performance:
In an offshore ISD project, greater use of mechanistic governance strengthens the extent to which contract specificity enhances its quality performance.
As discussed in the previous section, evaluation information required for assessing cost performance is partly specified in the contract in the form of negotiated prices, and is partly dependent on the ongoing trusted relationship between the client and vendor, which determines the "appropriateness" of prices for the client. thus, ISD cost performance is measured not only by comparing the final cost with the contractually agreed upon price but also by assessing the client's and vendor's ability to accommodate changes in prices due to dynamic market offerings or cost overruns. yet, in most cases, the client expects the vendor to stick to prenegotiated prices so as to counter uncertainties. hence, if the vendor is able to adhere to agreed upon prices (as specified in the contract) without any escalations, the client views it as appropriate ISD cost performance. Close adherence to the contract for achieving prespecified cost standards can be ensured through mechanistic governance. So we expect mechanistic governance to positively moderate the impact of contract specificity on ISD project cost performance:
In an offshore ISD project, greater use of mechanistic governance strengthens the extent to which contract specificity enhances its cost performance.
Mechanistic Governance as Substitute to relational Governance
Process control mechanisms (relational and mechanistic governance) serve to actualize the attempted control specified through structural control mechanism (contract). relational governance, based on the relational perspective, specifies that despite having a prespecified contract, client and vendor can choose to rely more on their ongoing relationship and mutual trust for deciding about emergent operational situations. relational exchange does play some role in influencing the ISD quality performance by providing better visibility of the vendor's quality processes to the client. But once the quality processes are known through relational mechanisms, no further dynamic evaluation information is accessed by the client. ISD quality performance evaluation is more of a static process where the attained quality levels are compared to the prespecified quality standards. Clearly, quality standards generally do not change during the course of contract implementation.
Mechanistic governance, however, which is based on close compliance to the prespecified rules in the contract without due consideration of trust and the ongoing relationship between the client and vendor, may signal that the vendor is not trustworthy enough. But the negative influence of mechanistic governance on the role of relational governance will be realized only in cases where there is an ongoing regular dynamic exchange of information between the client and vendor. For quality evaluation, as explained above, the information exchanged through relational mechanisms is primarily static. thus, for ISD quality performance, relational mechanisms primarily assist in informing about the quality processes adhered to by the vendor for achieving the specified quality standards. Also, quality standards and information required for evaluation of quality performance are relatively stable. As this information is not dynamic in nature, the role of relational governance for acquiring evaluation information is not dependent on an ongoing interaction between the client and vendor. Consequently, we do not expect mechanistic governance to significantly influence the impact of relational governance on ISD quality performance:
In an offshore ISD project, greater use of mechanistic governance does not influence the extent to which relational governance enhances its quality performance.
Cost performance relates to the client's perception about the "appropriateness" of the price paid for services received from the vendor, which in turn should serve to maximize cost savings for the client. relational governance influences ISD cost performance in two ways. First, by providing better visibility of vendor's cost structures, it helps the client appreciate reasons for vendor cost overruns, if any. Second, by enabling free information exchange between the client and vendor, it informs about the dynamic market rates. It is plausible that in the competitive landscape of the vendor ISD market, similar outsourced services might become available for a lesser price from alternate vendors. Such situations, informed by relational exchanges, entail price renegotiation between the client and vendor. It must be noted that unlike the case of information needed for ISD quality evaluation, the information required for ISD cost evaluation is dynamic, market dependent, and largely dependent on the ongoing relationship between the client and vendor. this ongoing relational exchange assists the client in assessing the appropriateness of the prices charged by the vendor. thus, relational governance, based on mutual trust, the relationship, and shared vision between the client and vendor, is an important mechanism influencing project cost perception of the client, which consequently influences ISD cost performance on an ongoing basis.
In contrast, mechanistic governance is based on the transactional perspective, which assumes self-interest that each party has from the relationship. Differences in goals and operational routines, opportunistic behaviors, uncertainty, changing expectations, and unexpected market changes are some of the reasons that both contracting parties may wish to mitigate through a mechanistically governed transactional relationship [42, 71] . this supposition contravenes the basic assumption of trusting the outsourcing partner. hence, mechanistic governance, which is based on close compliance to prespecified rules in the contract without due consideration of trust and an ongoing relationship between the client and vendor, may signify that the vendor is not deemed trustworthy enough. this could send negative signals to the vendor, thereby attenuating the effect of relational governance on ISD cost performance. It follows that 
Methodology Instrument and Data Collection
we ChoSe to ColleCt projeCt-level data from indian vendorS involved in ISD for offshore clients. Choice of India as the research location is justified by the fact that it is the leading offshore ISD vendor nation, catering to nearly 60 percent of the total world requirement for offshore ISD [40] . the survey instrument was developed by adapting items from previous research where psychometric properties have been established. the survey was administered to project managers and members of the offshore ISD teams. the items for the survey and the construct reliabilities are indicated in table 2. Data on project-and performance-related variables were collected from the project manager, whereas data on attributes of the project team were collected from two members of each of the respective software development teams. the responses of the two project team members were aggregated and analyzed in conjunction with the matched data from the project manager.
During the questionnaire development, we were in regular contact with three senior offshore software development industry executives and two senior executives at the National Association of Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM) 1 so as to have their constant feedback on the items and scales. After the initial questionnaire was ready, it was pretested with five senior industry executives in India (in charge of offshore software development), and their detailed feedback was incorporated in improving the readability and industry orientation of the items in the questionnaire. Subsequently, the modified questionnaire was first used for doing a pilot survey for 23 projects, and then data were collected for 169 recently completed offshore software development projects from 8 vendors working for mostly U.S. clients. All the chosen vendors had capability maturity model (CMM) level 5 certification and so were essentially similar in terms of their ISD work processes. In the final analysis, we included data from 160 projects because 9 questionnaires were incomplete.
Control Variables, Validity, and reliability
Because the dependent performance variables may be influenced by factors other than those in the hypothesized model, we incorporated suitable controls in the regression equations for the two performance variables (ISD quality performance and ISD cost performance) to better understand the variance explained by the research variables. Control variables of four different types were included in the research model to The contract clearly specified the key service-level agreements.
CSPE3
The contract was a comprehensive document in which key exigencies had already been taken care of.
CSPE4
The contract specified the penalties to which the vendor firm was liable in the event of nonperformance.
CSPE5
The contract meticulously covered the important aspects of the vendor's business relationship with the client. Mechanistic governance (α = 0.75) (based on [7, 36] ) MGOV1 The vendor project team members were aware of the details specified in the contract with the client.
MGOV2
The vendor referred to the contract for day-to-day operations.
MGOV3
The client expected the vendor to adhere to the contract very closely. Relational governance (α = 0.80) (based on [7, 36, 50, 51] The vendor project team could span several of their areas and client's expertise to develop shared project concepts for the client. Knowledge stickiness (α = 0.84) (based on [25] ) KSTX1 The client had an extensive documentation that described all the critical parts of this project.
KSTX2
Training required to perform the client's project was readily available in manuals.
Note: Scale anchored by 1 = "strongly disagree" and 7 = "strongly agree." account for alternative explanations: (1) vendor firm characteristics-seven vendor firm dummies, vendor firm experience with the specific client; (2) vendor employee characteristics-vendor employee experience with the specific client firm, total vendor employee experience; (3) partnership characteristics-size of work team, type of contract (fixed price or time and material); and (4) project knowledge characteristicsknowledge stickiness, knowledge integration. We checked for three types of validity, namely, content validity, convergent validity, and discriminant validity. Content validity assesses if the chosen measures appropriately capture the full domain of the construct. In this research, content validity was examined by checking for consistency between the measurement items and the existing literature, followed by pilot testing the instrument [60] . Convergent validity detects if the measures for a construct are more correlated with one another than with the measures of another construct [54] . Factor loadings measure the strength of the correlation between each item and the corresponding construct. As seen in table 3, the factor loading values (in boldface) show that there is a strong correlation between each of the indicators and their corresponding construct. We also checked the structure for confirmatory factor analysis and found it to be satisfactory. We verified the discriminant validity of the various constructs by checking the cross-loadings of the indicators on other constructs. From table 3, we observe that the cross-loadings are quite low, thereby indicating discriminant validity. From table 2, we observe that the Cronbach's alpha for all the research constructs ranges between 0.73 and 0.90. As the values of Cronbach's alpha for all the constructs are above 0.70, we conclude that reliabilities for all the constructs are adequate.
results and Discussion in our data Set, 80 projeCtS were "fixed priCe" (fp) ContraCtS and 80 were "time and material" (t&M) contracts. the average number of team members in these projects was 14.93 (SD [standard deviation] = 12.77). the vendor company had an average experience of 35.34 months (SD = 21.76) with the specific client company. table 4 provides the means, standard deviations, and correlations for all the variables used in the study.
Prior research has found relationships between cost and quality performance in different contexts (e.g., [23, 35] ). this implies that the equation disturbances for the two dependent variables (ISD quality and cost performance) might be correlated with each other due to omitted factors that influence both ISD quality and cost performance. hence, there is a possibility of correlated error terms among the formulated regression equations predicting ISD quality and cost performance. to allay any possibility of biased estimates using ordinary least squares, our model is estimated using seemingly unrelated regression (SUr). Moreover, this approach also helps preclude concerns about the sampled ISD projects being part of larger projects [48] . Specifically, a three-step hierarchical SUr model is used for testing the hypotheses. In the first step, we introduced all the control variables, followed by main effects in the second step. In the third step, we added the interaction terms between the structural and process Notes: CSPE = contract specificity; MGOV = mechanistic governance; rGOV = relational governance; QPEr = quality performance; CPEr = cost performance; KINt = knowledge integration; KStX = knowledge stickiness. Boldface signifies loadings of indicators on their corresponding constructs.
mechanisms. Following guidelines outlined by Aiken and West [2]
, we mean-centered all values prior to creating the interaction terms to reduce collinearity between the main effects and interaction terms. We also checked for multicollinearity of our predictors and calculated the variance inflation factor (VIF), which ranged from 1.31 to 2.18. As all the VIF values are less than 5 and all the correlations among independent and control variables are below 0.80, there are no significant multicollinearity problems [20, 22] . the regression results for hypothesis testing are presented in table 5 . the control variables together explain 22.8 percent of the variance in the ISD project's quality performance. Several control variables were nonsignificant, but we observe the significant effect of knowledge-and experience-related variables on quality performance. Of the main effects, in the second step, contract specificity (β = 0.25, p < 0.01) and relational governance (β = 0.13, p < 0.05) were significantly related to quality performance, whereas the relationship of mechanistic governance with quality performance (β = 0.01, ns) was nonsignificant. Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 1
Control variables From an "evaluation information perspective," contract specificity sets and communicates information about the specified quality metrics, thereby significantly influencing quality performance, whereas the other significantly related variable, that is, relational governance, informs ISD quality performance by providing better visibility of the vendor's quality processes to the client through relational exchange. the significant main effect of contract specificity is also consistent with several studies that suggest a positive link between contract extensiveness and performance (e.g., [3, 61] ). Similarly, prior research has also established the significant role that relational governance plays in influencing exchange performance (e.g., [55, 71] ). the nonsignificant main effect of mechanistic governance is explained by the fact that mechanistic governance does not provide any additional evaluation information for quality performance over and above what is specified in the contract. the third step analyzes the hypothesized interaction effect among structural and process control mechanisms. Specifically, we examine the moderating influence of mechanistic governance on the effect of contract specificity and relational governance on ISD quality performance. the interaction term between mechanistic governance and contract specificity is positive and significant (β = 0.06, p < 0.01), indicating that mechanistic governance strengthens the relationship between contract specificity and ISD quality performance, thereby supporting h1. the interaction term between mechanistic governance and relational governance is nonsignificant (β = -0.09, ns), indicating that mechanistic governance does not influence the relationship between relational governance and ISD quality performance, thereby supporting h3. Further, from results in table 5, we also notice that relational governance does not significantly moderate the relationship between contract specificity and ISD quality performance. A plausible reason is that the outcomes/behaviors for the contractually specified quality metrics are relatively easy to specify and observe; hence, relational governance does not assist in providing significant additional information about the contractually specified quality performance beyond that specified in the contract.
Next, we analyze the relationship of governance mechanisms with ISD cost performance. the control variables together explain 29.4 percent of the variance in ISD project's cost performance. Several control variables were nonsignificant, but similar to quality performance we observe the significant effect of knowledge-related variables. Vendor company experience with the client and vendor employee experience with the client are also significant, although in opposite directions. One plausible reason for the negative relationship of employee experience with the specific client may be the employee's lack of experience with other client firms, resulting in his or her inability to bring cross-learning experiences to the relationship. this might adversely affect the client's perception regarding the appropriateness of price levels offered by the vendor, thereby influencing the project's cost performance. the type of contract (i.e., whether it is a fixed price or a time and material contract) also has a significant influence on cost performance. Of the main effects, in the second step, contract specificity (β = 0.17, p < 0.01) and relational governance (β = 0.20, p < 0.01) were significantly related to cost performance, whereas the relationship of mechanistic governance with cost performance (β = 0.04, ns) was nonsignificant. Again, similar to our argument earlier in this section, from an "evaluation information perspective," contract specificity sets and communicates information about the specified cost metrics, thereby significantly influencing cost performance. the other significantly related variable, that is, relational governance, informs ISD cost performance by providing better visibility of the vendor's cost structures to the client through relational exchange. relational governance is also useful in exchanging information between the client and vendor about the dynamic market conditions and vendor cost overruns, thereby providing a basis for renegotiating prices, if required. this is also instrumental in the favorable perception of the appropriateness of the offered prices, thereby influencing ISD cost performance. the significant main effect of contract specificity is also consistent with several studies that suggest a positive link between contract extensiveness and performance (e.g., [3, 61] ). Similarly, prior research has also established the significant role that relational governance plays in influencing exchange performance (e.g., [55, 71] ). Again, the nonsignificant main effect of mechanistic governance is explained by the fact that it does not provide any additional evaluation information over and above what is specified in the contract. the third step analyzes the hypothesized interaction effects among structural and process control mechanisms. Specifically, we examine the moderating influence of mechanistic governance on the effect of contract specificity and relational governance on ISD cost performance. the interaction term between mechanistic governance and contract specificity is positive and significant (β = 0.06, p < 0.05), indicating that mechanistic governance strengthens the relationship between contract specificity and cost performance, thereby supporting h2. Similarly, the interaction term between mechanistic governance and relational governance is also significant (β = -0.12, p < 0.05), but in the negative direction. this indicates that mechanistic governance weakens the relationship between relational governance and cost performance, thereby supporting h4.
Similar to the result for ISD quality performance, we observe that relational governance does not significantly moderate the relationship between contract specificity and ISD cost performance. A plausible reason may again be explained from the evaluation information perspective [63, 64] . the outcomes for the "contractually specified cost metrics" are relatively straightforward to observe; hence, relational governance does not assist in providing significant additional information about the realization of the specified contract through relational exchange mechanisms. But it should be noted that cost performance is not totally dependent on close adherence to the contract as many of the cost performance parameters are dynamic and cannot be accurately specified in the contract as explained in the previous section.
to better understand the pattern of interactions between structural and process control mechanisms for ISD, we plotted the significant interactions by following Aiken and West's [2] guidelines. Because we are interested in examining the role of mechanistic governance in influencing the impact of contract specificity and relational governance on ISD performance, the slopes of the lines were plotted one standard deviation above and below the mean of mechanistic governance mechanism. Figure 2a shows the interaction of mechanistic governance with contract specificity on ISD quality performance. Mechanistic governance moderates the influence of contract specificity on ISD quality performance, but a high level of mechanistic governance is beneficial only in a scenario of high contract specificity, that is, in a scenario of a well-specified and detailed contract. When the contract specificity is low, high mechanistic governance will lead to lower ISD quality performance, plausibly because the vendor may not be clear what is to be closely adhered to. In the case of a poorly specified contract, it might be better to be more flexible in the way the vendor executes the job. this result is interesting as it highlights the complementary nature of mechanistic governance only in a scenario of high contract specificity.
A similar phenomenon is observed for impact of the interaction between contract specificity and mechanistic governance on ISD cost performance (Figure 2b) . A high level of mechanistic governance is beneficial only in a scenario of high contract specificity. For low levels of contract specificity, high mechanistic governance will have an adverse effect on ISD cost performance as compared to low levels of mechanistic governance. One explanation is that when the contract is not well specified, then even following it rigidly will not lead to beneficial results. But when the contract is well formulated, detailed, and covers all exigencies, its strict compliance will yield beneficial results in terms of the two examined performance attributes, namely, ISD quality and ISD cost. thus, mechanistic governance complements the effect of contract specificity on ISD quality and cost performance, which is beneficial for the client only in the scenario of high level of contract specificity. If the contract specificity is low, the client may have better performance if less control in terms of mechanistic governance is exercised over the vendor. Figure 2c shows the impact of interaction between the two process control mechanisms, that is, relational governance and mechanistic governance, on cost performance. Both prior research as well as results in this research indicate the positive influence of relational governance on cost performance. through this interaction plot, we assess how mechanistic governance moderates the effect of relational governance on ISD cost performance. From the plot, we observe that mechanistic governance weakens the positive effect of relational governance on ISD cost performance. In fact, we see that at high levels of mechanistic governance, the positive influence of relational governance is almost nullified and the line becomes nearly horizontal. From the graph, we also observe that at low levels of relational governance, a high level of mechanistic governance is beneficial for ISD cost performance. this indicates that mechanistic governance substitutes the effect of relational governance in enhancing ISD cost performance. From the results, we conclude that mechanistic governance plays a vital role in determining ISD performance. We extend prior research that has shown a positive influence of contract specificity on contract performance, by demonstrating the impact of mechanistic governance on this relationship. Mechanistic governance strengthens (complements) the benefits of contract specificity in enhancing ISD quality and cost performance. Further, the results also show that mechanistic governance attenuates the effect of relational governance in enhancing ISD cost performance. hence, mechanistic governance can be viewed as a substitute to relational governance in the context of ISD cost performance.
Post hoc Analysis results in the previous section indicate that contract type (whether FP or t&M) was a significant control variable for ISD cost performance. As FP and t&M are the two prime modes for contracting prevalent for offshore ISD, we conducted a post hoc analysis to understand the performance outcomes for these two modes. An FP contract is a method of contracting in which a preset and agreed-upon price is paid for specified deliverables regardless of the actual costs incurred by the vendor. An FP contract places minimum administrative burden on the client, but puts the vendor to the maximum risk arising from all cost escalations. yet, in many FP contracts, there may be renegotiations between the client and vendor during contract implementation to address the dynamic market conditions or emergent price escalations. In a t&M contract, the client pays an agreed hourly or daily rate for input provided by the vendor. the client has to bear any additional related expenses not foreseen. Prior research has treated these two contracting mechanisms as very different contracting modes (e.g., [17, 18] ). hence, we considered it imperative to understand the differences between these two subgroups for a holistic appreciation of the phenomenon. Of the 160 examined contracts in the sample, 80 were FP contracts and 80 were t&M contracts. the regression results for the two subgroups are shown in tables 6 and 7.
For the FP contracts subgroup, we observe the significant relationship of contract specificity (β = 0.16, p < 0.05) with ISD quality performance. Unlike the full model, relational governance (β = 0.12, ns) has a nonsignificant relationship with quality performance. But mechanistic governance positively moderates the impact of contract specificity on quality performance (β = 0.12, p < 0.01). however, for ISD cost performance, similar to the full model, both contract specificity (β = 0.18, p < 0.05) and relational governance (β = 0.25, p < 0.01) have significant relationships with ISD cost performance. From these results, we see that ISD quality for FP contracts is more of a transactional phenomenon, whereas ISD cost performance for FP contracts is a relational as well as a transactional phenomenon. But because mechanistic governance does not moderate the relationship between contract specificity and ISD cost performance (β = -0.04, ns), we conclude that for FP contracts, cost performance is largely a relational phenomenon. hence, there is a need to be open to information exchange between the client and vendor during contract implementation to cater to any price table 6 . results of Seemingly Unrelated regressions (FP Contracts) ISD quality performance ISD cost performance
Step 3 ISD quality performance ISD cost performance
Step 3 Step 1
Step 3 renegotiations due to exigencies, if required. Also, depending on the required specific outcomes, the governance mechanisms can be suitably orchestrated. For the t&M contracts subgroup, we observe the significant relationship of contract specificity (β = 0.28, p < 0.01) with quality performance. We also notice that mechanistic governance (β = -0.16, p < 0.05) significantly moderates the relationship between relational governance and quality performance. But understanding this interaction effect is not vital for the current research because, from the results, we see that relational governance and quality performance do not have a significant relationship. None of the other main effects or interaction effects among control mechanisms is significant. thus, from an evaluation information perspective, no additional evaluation information is provided by either relational or mechanistic governance mechanisms. the reason is that clients generally use t&M contracts in two extremely opposite cases, as explained below. In the first case, clients use t&M contracts when they are fully knowledgeable about the work requirements. t&M contracts offer flexibility in the client's staffing requirements and function merely as human resource augmentation projects to cater to additional staff requirements when the need arises. So, in effect, the client de facto manages the work. Alternatively, in the second case, the client may resort to t&M contracts for new developmental work where the client has no clear idea about the project requirements, outcome, and quality standards. In such a situation, t&M contracts allow the flexibility to experiment with different options. recall the discussion in the previous sections about quality performance, where the client has to be familiar with (or learn by interacting with the vendor) its ISD quality requirements clearly so as to achieve them. Because in neither of the two cases described above is there any additional evaluation information provided by the process control mechanisms (mechanistic or relational governance), the structural control mechanism (formal t&M contract) becomes the sole mechanism that can inform about ISD quality performance. this explains the significant relationship of contract specificity for quality performance.
In contrast, contract specificity (β = 0.18, p < 0.01), relational governance (β = -0.24, p < 0.01), and also the interaction of contract specificity with mechanistic governance (β = 0.07, p < 0.01) have significant relationships with ISD cost performance for t&M contracts. the results are broadly similar to that of the full model except for one surprising difference. the sign for the relational governance term for t&M contracts is negative rather than positive, indicating that relational governance may actually have an adverse effect on ISD cost performance for t&M projects. As indicated earlier, many of the t&M projects are more like human resource augmentation projects where the client clearly knows its requirements and hires the vendor's employees at a per hour rate. In such a situation, the primary locus of control on contract execution rests with the client. hence, if there is an excessive relational exchange, the client may have to accommodate the vendor's requests for price escalations. Note that in the case of t&M contracts, because there is no fixed price for the contractual work, the vendor's risk is rather limited. hence, generally for t&M contracts, any price-related information exchanged through relational mechanisms should favor the vendor. together, the results for FP and t&M contracts indicate the more transactional nature of ISD quality performance and a mix of transactional and relational nature of ISD cost performance. Mechanistic governance complements the role of contract specificity for ISD quality performance (for FP contracts) and ISD cost performance (for t&M contracts). Further, the differential impact of relational governance on FP and t&M cost performance provides nuanced insights for efficient contract governance. Of special interest is the result that relational governance has a positive relationship with ISD cost performance for FP contracts and a negative relationship with ISD cost performance for t&M contracts.
Implications for research
First, prior control literature specifies and describes the two key control modes, that is, formal and informal control modes. these modes are further subdivided; outcome control and behavior control being formal modes, and clan control and self-control being informal modes [28] . yet existing literature does not explicitly describe the control mechanisms acting within each of the specified control modes. Control mechanisms are the ways in which different control modes are enacted, that is, "what" and "how" control modes operate. Often the description of control modes subsumes the underlying control mechanisms, that is, control modes depict not only "what" is controlled (e.g., what outcomes and behaviors) but also "how" it is controlled (i.e., the processes used to attain the desired outcomes and behaviors). In this research, we enunciate a framework for distinguishing between these different control submechanisms (i.e., what and how, which we describe as structural and process mechanisms) within each of the control modes, thereby offering a more nuanced theoretical understanding of the control portfolios in the context of contract administration. the usefulness of this conceptualization is exhibited by the granular interaction effects that we observe within and across the different control structures and processes in influencing ISD project performance. We believe that distinguishing between the structural and process mechanisms is imperative for a richer understanding of the ISD outsourcing phenomenon. this paper thus contributes to better understanding of the distinctions inherent in the control perspective. In this research, we examined only the formal control mode structural mechanisms. Future research can use the elucidated framework (Figure 1 ) for understanding the roles that other informal structural and process control mechanisms play.
Second, although past research has examined the role of contract specificity and relational governance, mechanistic governance has not been explicitly acknowledged in the contract literature. By integrating control theory with prior research on contracts from transactional and relational perspectives, this study conceptualizes mechanistic governance as a distinct process control mechanism. Further, we theorize the important role that mechanistic governance plays in the context of offshore ISD. Specifically, we examine the moderating influence of mechanistic governance on the relationship between contract specificity and ISD performance, and also on the relationship between relational governance and ISD performance. this research also shows that in an offshore ISD contractual relationship, both relational and mechanistic governance mechanisms co-exist and play different roles. In fact, the discriminant validity test and the low correlation between these two constructs (0.19) underscore the point that the two process control mechanisms are not opposites. their appropriate ambidextrous combination could possibly assist in efficient contract performance. Further research needs to examine such issues related to the use of mechanistic governance as an explicit control mechanism for contract implementation.
third, using control theory and the evaluation information requirement perspective, we theorize the interactional influence of various structural and process control mechanisms for ISD contract performance. Specifically, we examine the moderating influence of mechanistic governance on the relationships of contract specificity and relational governance with ISD performance (quality and cost). this theorizing assists in distinguishing between the nature of the two performance variables considered in this study, that is, ISD quality performance and ISD cost performance, thereby contributing to the literature on offshore outsourced ISD performance. results show that the control modes and mechanisms influence the two performance measures (ISD quality performance and ISD cost performance) differently, depending on the informational requirements to make the performance evaluation. this result is consistent with tiwana [63], who found that different types of control require different informational requirements for evaluation. this reiterates the importance of understanding the systems development project requirements clearly for effectively managing their performance.
Fourth, post hoc analyses distinguishing between the roles of control mechanisms for FP and t&M contracts exhibit the key considerations for administering such contracts. Although the importance of specifying a detailed contract is established for both FP and t&M contracts, it is particularly more salient for t&M contracts. there are differences in the roles played by process governance mechanisms for quality and cost performance. the results for FP contracts clearly indicate the transactional nature of ISD quality performance and the relational nature of ISD cost performance. At the same time, the results for t&M contracts indicate the transactional nature for both quality and cost performances. In fact, relational governance has a negative influence on ISD cost performance for t&M contracts. Specifically, mechanistic governance complements the role of contract specificity for ISD quality performance (for FP contracts) and ISD cost performance (for t&M contracts). Also, there are differential effects of relational governance on FP and t&M cost performance. this analysis develops the theory on these two contract types commonly used for administering offshore ISD, thereby extending the research on this subject [17, 18] .
Implications for Practice
In addition to implications for research, the study also has several implications for practitioners. First, while managers are generally aware that some degree of contract specificity is often necessary for contract performance, they are also worried that too much contract specificity may decrease flexibility, with consequent negative effects on performance. Our findings suggest that contract specificity is positively related to both ISD quality and cost performance, thereby providing empirical evidence for the necessity of having well-specified and detailed contracts.
Second, although the need for a well-specified contract and relational governance has been discussed in the literature [3, 61, 63] , mechanistic governance as a separate control mechanism has not been explicitly modeled. It is often considered an integral part of a well-specified contract. the current research highlights the need for conceptualizing contract specification and contract implementation as two different control submechanisms where mechanistic governance is one of the ways in which the contract could be implemented. Managers should explicitly consider mechanistic governance as an option available for enacting control mechanisms.
third, the interaction plots (Figures 2a, 2b , and 2c) provide further insights to managers on deciding the use of different control mechanisms; for example, a high level of mechanistic governance will have a positive effect on quality and cost performance only when the contract specificity is high. In case of low contract specificity, a high level of mechanistic governance will lead to suboptimal performance. hence, managers must realize that enforcing a poorly formulated contract through mechanistic governance is unlikely to result in better performance for quality and cost performance. Also, managers should take note of the attenuating effect of mechanistic governance on the positive effect of relational governance on ISD cost performance. these results provide clear directions to managers looking for ISD performance on cost and quality parameters.
Fourth, results suggest that different types of control governance mechanisms have different influences (direct and moderating influences) on ISD performance. hence, it is vital for managers to understand not only the need for having well-specified ISD contracts but also how contracts are governed. Specifically, relational governance has positive direct relationships with ISD quality and cost performance, but mechanistic governance is instrumental in complementing the role of contract specificity and substitutes the role of relational governance in case of ISD cost performance. Further, we also see that there is divergence in the ways control mechanisms affect different types of contracts (FP and t&M). For example, relational governance may adversely affect the cost performance of a t&M systems development contract. hence, it is imperative for managers to appreciate the situations under which different governance mechanisms are beneficial and plan to implement contract control mechanisms accordingly. the significant roles played by different control mechanisms in affecting ISD cost and quality performance for FP and t&M contracts are summarized in table 8. limitations and Future research there are five key limitations of this study that could be addressed by future research. First, while there are other structural control mechanisms, we focus primarily on contract specificity. Future research could examine the roles of other structural control mechanisms shown in Figure 1 . Second, we do not examine self-governance as a process control mechanism. Future research could examine situations under which self-governance is effective. third, our study is carried out using offshored ISD projects from Indian vendors. Future research could examine offshoring vendors from other countries. Conceivably, because of differences in culture, contracts and different forms of control governance may be viewed differently. Fourth, we do not explicitly discuss the role of decision rights, which is treated as a form of project-level governance in some research (e.g., [61, 63] ). Future research could examine the relationship between structural and process control mechanisms with decision rights. Fifth, in our post hoc analysis, we examine two key contract types (FP and t&M). Future research could examine other contract types as well as assist in further developing our understanding of the choice of different contract types for outsourcing different kinds of jobs.
Conclusions
uSing Control theory, thiS Study ConCeptualizeS mechanistic governance as a significant control submechanism that clients can use for managing vendors in an offshore ISD context. Grounding arguments in the information required for performance evaluation, this study theorizes the moderating influence of mechanistic governance on the relationships of contract specificity and relational governance with ISD quality and cost performance. results establish the significant complementary role of mechanistic governance on the relationships of contract specificity with ISD quality performance and ISD cost performance. Further, mechanistic governance plays a substitutive role on the relationship between relational governance and cost performance. thus, the study theoretically as well as empirically establishes the need for conceptualizing mechanistic governance as a viable and significant governance mechanism for off- [3] Database of 858 transactions for IT products and services Costs of contracting are associated with increased use of contract terms on assignment of rights, after-sales service, and legal recourse. Management control structures that are better aligned with transaction hazards mitigate subsequent performance problems, though at a nontrivial cost of contracting.
[8] Five cases of outsourced ISD projects The portfolios of control in outsourced projects are dominated by outcome controls, especially at the start of the project, although the precision and frequency of these controls varies across projects. Behavior controls are often added later in the project, as are controls aimed to encourage and enable vendor self-control. Clan controls were used when the client and vendor had shared goals, and when frequent interactions led to shared values.
[14] Survey of 92 South Korean IT executives Formal contracts and relational governance act as complements. Change characteristics of servicelevel agreements act as a substitute for relational governance.
[15] Data from 96 projects in India Formal and informal control modes have a significant effect on software project outcomes. Boundary-spanning activities significantly improve the effectiveness of formal controls.
Collaborative culture provides mixed benefits by enhancing quality but reducing efficiency.
[16] Data from 100 offshore ISD projects Drivers and returns to quality vary by contract type.
[17] Data from 55 FP and 38 T&M projects Vendor would prefer an FP contract for larger and longer projects with larger teams, and a T&M contract when the risk of employee attrition from the project team is high.
[18] Data from 93 offshore projects from a leading Indian software vendor Contract choice significantly determines project profit. Some ex ante vendor-, client-, and projectrelated characteristics known at the time of choosing the contract continue to significantly influence project profits after controlling for contract choice. Project duration and team size affect project profits.
[30] Data from case studies of two IS projects Control is exercised differently for each phase of the ISD project. [33] Interviews with 9 customer project managers and 6 supplier project managers. Survey of 179 customer project managers and 191 supplier project managers, from 158 organizations Results show that fulfilled obligations predict success over and above the effects of contract type, duration, and size.
[47] Survey of 110 project managers in 9 Chinese IS outsourcers Client control over the vendor had a significant effect on cost control, helping the vendor prevent cost overruns, but not on project quality.
[52] Sample of 56 firms in the software industry in the United States Performance is enhanced by standardization of performance criteria while giving each project team authority to make decisions with respect to methods.
[55] Survey of 285 IS executives Formal contracts and relational governance function as complements.
[56] Data from 85 outsourced ISD projects from an Indian vendor Strong evidence of the input bias, which leads managers' subjective assessments to diverge considerably from objective outcomes, and that it is moderated by contract type.
[58] Data from 138 client-vendor matched pairs working in 8 large, long-term, ongoing outsourcing arrangements Clients with technical or relationship management knowledge, or with high trust in their vendors, use formal control mechanisms to a lesser extent. Task uncertainty is positively associated with the amount of formal control, and the degree of core competency is not related to formal control.
[61] Data from 103 outsourcing contracts Results indicate the importance of deliberate and well-planned contract design choices, and the strategic role of decision rights (e.g., extensibility provisions) to limit opportunistic bargaining.
[62] Data from 89 projects in 89 firms in United States Examines how governance-knowledge fit shapes ISD performance by influencing the effective exercise of project decision rights during ISD.
[63] Data from 120 outsourced ISD projects Informal control mechanisms strengthen the relationship between formal behavior control mechanisms and ambidexterity but weaken the effect of formal control mechanisms.
[64] Data from 57 outsourced and 79 internal projects in 136 organizations Controllers attempt greater use of control mechanisms in outsourced projects relative to internal projects, yet controls enhance ISD performance in internal projects but not in outsourced projects.
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